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This article comments on several aspects of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings (GRH or the Act), 1 the federal law enacted in December of 
last year, which purports to transfer major congressional budgetary 
powers to an administrative apparatus. The comments are divided 
into three parts. The first part concludes that the courts should not 
automatically assume that post-GRH appropriations bills are in-
tended to operate within GRH's framework. The second part looks 
at the separation of powers challenges to GRH currently proceeding 
in the courts.2 It concludes that, if the Supreme Court decides the 
delegation doctrine issue, it should, and probably will, for the first 
time since the 1930s, use that ground to invalidate a federal law. 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Thanks are 
due the law school's reference librarians and a large number of my colleagues who, as 
usual, were extremely generous with their help. 
l. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177,99 Stat 1037 (1985) [hereinafter cited as GRH]. 
2. As this article was prepared for publication, the challenges to GRH continued 
making their way through the courts. The resulting flux affects only the middle portion 
of this article. Only papers filed with the district court on or before January 8, 1986 
were considered for that section. 
On February 7, 1986, a three-judge district court voted to strike down GRH on the 
ground that congressional power to remove the Comptroller General made the delega-
tion to that office a violation of separation of powers doctrine. Synar v. United States, 
Nos. 85-3945,85-4106, slip. op. at 34-50 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1986) (available Feb. 28, 1986, 
on LEXIS, Genfed library). In what it clearly described as dictum, that court rejected 
the general antidelegation argument and concluded that the powers which GRH at-
tempted to grant the Comptroller General could be given to a proper delegate. !d. at 
13-28. An appeal is currently pending before the Supreme Court. 54 U.S.L.W. 3548 
(1986). 
1 
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The third part examines GRH in the context of the recent separa-
tion of powers decisions by the Court and the current debate on the 
construction of our Constitution. It also examines the current Ad-
ministration's position on such matters because that position may 
have some influence upon current or future Justices. It concludes 
that disturbing signs indicate that both the Court and the Adminis-
tration sometimes adopt a Framers' intent approach to individual 
provisions of the Constitution and, at other times, ignore such an 
approach in favor of adjusting the Constitution to the times. Either 
approach, applied consistently and deftly, could conserve the rela-
tive balance of power between Congress and the executive branch, 
roughly as envisioned by the Framers. The inconsistent use of both 
approaches threatens to upset that balance. 
1. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings As a Dictionary Act 
A reading of the Congressional debates,3 the newspaper ac-
counts,4 and the briefs in the cases attacking Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings on constitutional grounds5 reveals a common, and potentially 
significant, misconception about the Act's effect. GRH is described 
as a measure by which Congress has delegated to administrative au-
thorities, for six years if not repealed," the power to cut each annual 
budget deficit by specified amounts if Congress itself cannot. 7 This 
3. Sre 131 CoNG. REc. Sl7,385 (daily cd. Dec. II, 1985) (Remarks ofScnator.John-
ston); id. at Sl7,439 (Remarks of Senator Hawkins); id. at Sl4,920 (daily eel. Nov. G. 
1985) (Remarks of Senator Pcll). 
4. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1985, at B8, col. 4; id., Dec. 12, 1985, at AI. col.(). 
5. Memorandum of Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group of the House of Rep-
resentatives Regarding Balanced Budget and Deficit Control Act at 4. National Treasu1·\· 
Employees Union v. United States, No. 85-4106 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 19!·!() sub nom. Svnar \'. 
United States) (available Feb. 28, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library) [hereinafter cited as 
Speaker Memorandum]: 
All the signif1cant versions of the Act, preliminary and final alike. sha•·cd the 
central principle which may be called "automaticity," namclv. that the kev de-
termination to trigger the Act's across-the-board cuts had to be made 
automatically. 
Sre also Memorandum of Intervenor United States Senate in Support of its !\lotions to 
Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintifl's' Motion for Summarv Judgment at 4. Synar \'. 
United States, No. 85-3945 (D.D.C. Feb. 7. 1986) (available Feb. 28. I !)86. on U:XIS. 
Genfcd library) I hereinafter cited as Senate Memorandum[. Srnar and .\'a tiona/ Trra.H/1')' 
EmjJ/oyrrs were consolidated on January 2. 1986. Srr l\femorandum in Support of Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 . .\'ational Trfri.HII')' J~'ntfJiorrr.L The plaimifl:~· nm-
stitutional arguments are discussed infra at notes 23-112 and acnHnpam·ing text. On 
February 7. 1986, the district court held GRH to he unconstitutional. and the parties 
appealed to the Supreme Court. Sre sufJI'a note 2. 
6. For the relevance of implied repealers. sec infra note 20 and accompanying· text. 
7. For examples of congressional debates, newspaper accounts, and briefs evidenc-
ing such a view, sec .HifJI'a notes 3-5. 
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correctly describes what the language of the Act attempts,M but it 
cannot accurately describe its operation. Upon appropriations bills 
passed after its effective date, GRH can operate only to the extent 
that any such later bill expressly or impliedly incorporates it by ref-
erence. Thus, when Congress "appropriates $200 million" for this 
or for that, the question must be asked: Did Congress intend to 
appropriate subject to GRH or not subject to it? 
Surely there can be no question that either option is open to 
Congress. Congress cannot bind its future self not to pass laws of 
certain sorts: to do that would require a constitutional amendment. 
In light of this basic fact of the legislative process, it is clear that 
GRH will operate, however obscurely, only as something of a "dic-
tionary act," which attempts to legislate methods for construing 
later statutes. The Dictionary Act of 1871,9 and more recently the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 10 provide other examples of 
this kind of legislation. At the most, GRH seeks to require courts to 
read future appropriations bills as subject to GRH unless they con-
tain express language opting out. At the least, it entreats courts to 
harmonize future law with GRH and may provide some evidence of 
the probable later intent of Congress. 
While the federal courts have never squarely addressed the va-
lidity of a dictionary act, there are indications of limits on the power 
of Congress to control the interpretation of future laws. First, one 
state supreme court has struck down, on separation of powers prin-
ciples, a state statute compelling the use of certain canons of statu-
tory construction. 11 Second, reason dictates the existence of limits 
on Congress' power to interfere with the courts' performance of 
their duty to ascertain the intent of the legislature's last pronounce-
ment on a subject. To take a clear example, surely one Congress 
could not, through elaborate and obscure requirements that only 
"magic words" be used, make it difficult for successor legislatures to 
accomplish what they prescribe clearly in ordinary English. While 
the federal courts have never confronted such an extreme case as 
that just posed, the case law record contains strong evidence of the 
courts' sense, if not conscious understanding, that they, and not the 
legislature, must ultimately determine how to read legislative intent. 
8. See GRH § 20 I (a)(7) (defining maximum deficit amount for years I !IHti-91 ); 
§§ 251 (a)( I )(A)-(C), (a)(2), (b)( I), (b)(2)(a); § 252(a)( I). 
9. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, 16 Stat. 431 (1871). 
10. 5 u.s.c. §§ 551-706 (1982). 
II. People v. Crawford Distrib. Co., 53 111.2d 332. 338-39, 291 N.E.2d 648. (152 
(1973). See W. REYNOI.DS,jliDICIAL PROCESS IN A Ntrrsm:u. § 5.15 (1!)80). 
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The Supreme Court, in its decisions under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, seems to recognize the possibility that Congress can 
abuse its control of statutory construction. 12 The Court's actual po-
sition may well go beyond this. It apparently acknowledges that any 
"dictionary act" controls interpretation only to the extent that a 
court believes that the act helps to ascertain the real intent when it 
exists or, in default of such intent, a reasonable result. For example, 
in Mitchum v. Foster, 13 the Supreme Coutt found that a later statute 
created an implied exception to an earlier statute that said it permit-
ted only express exceptions. 14 The driving force behind that deci-
sion, it seems, was the majority's sense of a real, but unexpressed, 
intent to exempt the later law from the operation of the earlier 
one. 15 
It is not my position that Congress is without a role to play in 
determining how later legislation will be read. It is rather that the 
courts themselves must decide, in light of a variety of policies, pre-
cisely what weight should be given to earlier statutes that would 
control the meaning of future legislation. There are two ways of 
articulating this view. The first would deny any binding effect to 
dictionary acts, but concede that courts should weigh them carefully 
because of their relevance to interpretation. The second would 
ascribe binding effect to such acts, but only when the courts deter-
mine that doing so does not frustrate the ability of the courts to give 
effect to the most recently expressed will of Congress. These two 
12. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (195.5). 
13. 407 u.s. 225 (1972). 
14. /d. at 231-43. The Civil Rights Act of 1871,42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), authorizes 
a "suit in equity"-and thus, implicitly, an injunction-against state officers. The Court 
found § 1983 to be an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, Act of Mar. 2, 1793, I Stat. 
335 (codified at 28 U .S.C. § 2283 (1982)), which bars federal courts from enjoining state 
court proceedings. 407 U.S. at 242-43. 
15. The Court explained its decision as an interpretation of the word "express" in 
the earlier statute to include not simply clear words in a later law, but also clear legisla-
tive intent not literally expressly included in the text. See id. at 237-38. However it may 
be rationalized, I believe that the relationship of the courts to the legislative process 
requires consideration of evidence of later intent, despite the mandates of the earlier 
law. I believe that if pressed by a law that, even more clearly than that involved in 
.Uitchum, required future exceptions to its provisions to be exp1-ess, the Court would make 
clear its freedom to ignore the earlier law in favor of the implicit but clear intent of a 
later law. It is, however, difficult to imagine how a statute could be clearer than the anti-
injunction act involved in Alitdwm without resorting to drafting such as ''express and we, 
really mean express." Because never so pressed, the Court has either never considered 
the problem or used the host of typical avoidance devices. As said earlier, conscious or 
subconscious sensitivity to these concerns on the part of the courts, and perhaps Con-
gress as well, has led to the issues being framed differently and resolved reasonably 
without confrontation. 
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positiOns are approximately the same, because in each the court 
would view itself as in control, willing and able to ignore earlier stat-
utes which infringe on the court's role as interpreter of law. 
The federal courts seem never to have expressly recognized 
their ultimate control largely because it is normally reasonable for a 
court to give great weight to earlier dictionary acts. Indeed as to 
earlier legislation such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 or 
the APA, which control the meaning of future legislation through 
control of the environment in which it will operate, it normally 
seems reasonable for courts to ignore the sort of issue that I am 
raising. I have no quarrel with viewing such acts as operative until 
repeal, and not simply hortatory, as long as it is recognized that the 
context or structure of a later enactment, if extraordinary, may merit 
the conclusion that the later Congress chose to opt out. It would be 
exhausting and generally unproductive, in the absence of over-
whelming evidence, for the courts to consider, on an individual ba-
sis, whether new causes of action were to be adjudicated using some 
or all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and whether new 
agency authority is subject to some or all of the APA. 17 Indeed, it is 
normally fair to assume that any current Congress would prefer the 
relatively mindless, across-the-board application of such rules to the 
chaos which would result from attempted case-by-case adjustments. 
GRH, however, poses a different case. It is not collateral but 
central, in any fair sense, to the meaning of future appropriations 
bills whether the sums they purport to provide may be taken at face 
value or as a ceiling subject to great reduction at the hands of ad-
ministrators. The stakes are enormous, both in terms of the poten-
tial effect on the federal government and on the development of law 
dealing with the power of Congress to delegate responsibility for 
major structural economic decisions to other decisionmakers. For 
this reason, if the Court is inclined to allow the bureaucracy to make 
such budget cuts, it should consider taking the unusual step of re-
quiring annual renewals of GRH in order for it to continue in opera-
tion. This would amount to a recognition that Congress may no 
longer intend to legislate subject to GRH, but, politically, may be 
16. Although such rules are made by the courts under a congressional grant of 
rulcmaking power, 28 U.S.C. § 2070 (1982), they are accorded the force of law and are 
equivalent to legislation for my purpose. 
17. Cf United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 ( 1973) (interpreting Inter-
state Commerce Act requirement for decisions after hearing in light of the APA). 
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unable to pass a repealer because it fears, for example, a Presiden-
tial veto. GRH was enacted with broad yet thin support IH and has 
been called the least lobbied major bill in recent memory. I!> The 
essence of the moral and legal charge against GRH is congressional 
abdication. When it is difficult to know just what Congress intends, 
an error on the side of reassertion of the ordinary legislative process 
seems less perverse than the reverse.:w Under all of these circum-
stances, the Court should reverse its usual presumption that an ear-
lier expressed will of Congress controls future legislation. 21 
The Court may well be unwilling to reverse its presumption of 
continued applicability based simply upon the policies discussed 
above. For appropriations bills passed shortly after GRH that spark 
little debate about that Act, the Court may reasonably conclude that 
18. As for the breadth of support (l) the vote in the House of Representatives was 
271 for, 154 against, 9 not voting, 131 CoNG. REc. H 11,903-04 (daily ed. Dec. 12. 1985); 
the vote in the Senate was 61 for, 31 against, 5 not voting, 2 paired, id. at S 17,443-44 
(daily ed. Dec. II, 1985). As for the thinness of support, Congressional Quarterly reported 
that many members of Congress felt GRH unwise and unworkable and that Sponsor 
Rudman himself referred to the bill as a "bad idea whose time has come." 43 CoNG. Q 
2604 (1985). 
19. A Senate staff member of the author's acquaintance characterized GRH this way. 
Published accounts agree: "Many members reported little overt lobbying either for or 
against the legislation, except for strong, last-minute objections from the defense de-
partment." 43 CoNG. Q 2604 (1985). 
20. Objections citing the presumption against implied repealer are to be anticipated, 
but are beside the point. The question is not one of GRH's repealer, but rather of its 
operation while in effect. It can be nothing more than hortatory in its aim that future 
money bills be subject to its dictates. It can be nothing more than persuasive. to an 
extent to be determined by a court, if seen as an attempt to provide presumptions 
through which later legislation is to be read. 
21. A wide variety of reasons other than lack of majority support could account f(H· 
the failure of a Congress that had turned against GRH to attempt express repealer. q: 
Wald, Some Observations on the Cse of ugislatil•e History in the 1981 Sujn·eme Court Trrm. li8 
IowA L. REv. 195, 206 n.90 (1983) (Court assumes substantive, rather than tactical or 
political, reasons for Congress' failure to pass legislation to change administrative inter-
pretation). It may be tempting, psychologically, to take the position that a Congress 
which had not the political will to pass a repealer should not be helped bv the courts. 
Either as a punitive position or as one requiring clear signals for the courts own conven-
ience, such a position does not recommend itself. The punitive view goes beyond poetic 
justice in inflicting harm, not only on Congress. but also on those Congress exists to 
serve. The clear signal approach is valid in its place-for example. the parol e\·idence 
rule and statute of frauds. It is even valid to a point in the setting of a dictionary act's 
application. For that reason, I see nothing pernicious in applying the Administratin· 
Procedure Act when no strong evidence of contrary intent appears. When. as hen·. 
there arc serious questions of unconstitutional congressional abdication of power and 
when there is strong implicit evidence of intent to legislate independentlv of an earlier 
measure. the calculus is different. It is one thing for the Court to create a presumption 
more likely than not to represent intent. It is another f(>r it to ignore its own strong·ly 
held view of intent, in favor of a presumption serving only ease of labor. 
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the consensus which produced GRH continues. The passage of 
time and widespread statements in floor debate of intent to legislate 
outside of GRH may, however, raise a reasonable doubt about con-
tinued consensus.22 Surely, in those circumstances, it would be 
more reasonable for the Court to require the legislative process to 
reindorse this unusual legislation. 
2. The Court Challenges Based on Separation of Powers Doctrine 
Of more likely immediate impact than the issues discussed 
above is the constitutional challenge to GRH currently pending in 
the Supreme Court. The two suits recently decided by the special 
three-judge federal district court23 attacked GRH on two main 
22. There have already been some skirmishes in the Congress over opting out of 
GRH. In one case, there is a frontal attack, attempting an express exemption for a par-
ticular money bill. See 132 CoNG. REc. H 1093 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1986) (description of 
H.R. 4391 as exempting certain veterans benefits from sequestration). In another, bear-
ing more directly on my arguments, there were apparent attempts implicitly to override 
GRH as to funding for a particular program. See 44 CoNG. Q 595 (1986). One provi-
sion passed the House of Representatives, despite claims by the Reagan Administration 
that it would violate GRH spending restrictions. /d. This provision, a proposed amend-
ment to H.R.J. Res. 534, would have added one billion dollars to a program for loans to 
farmers. It required hours of cajoling by Senate Republican leaders before the measure 
was defeated, then, by a large majority. /d. The pressures to opt out of GRH for popu-
lar programs are enormous and they will grow as its provisions for later years require 
vastly deeper cuts. 
An interesting problem would arise if many members of Congress stated on the 
record in debates over an appropriations bill that they did not intend to legislate subject 
to GRH, but the President signed the bill with a message stating a contrary intent. The 
relevance, to statutory construction, of the express intent of the President in signing a 
bill has been almost completely neglected in cases and scholarly commentary. Notable 
exceptions include W. REYNOLDS, LEGAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 234 (1980). Whether I 
agree with Professor Reynolds' statement that executive intent is entitled to weight 
equal to that accorded legislative intent depends upon how that statement is inter-
preted. The Constitution clearly contemplates that the process of passing a bill he 
proactive, that of vetoing reartive. Consequently, perhaps a President's statements that 
he or she understands a bill in a particulai; way generally should not contribute to fixing 
its meaning. Thus, the Presidential influence should be less than that of dearh· influen-
tial statements made in kgislatin· debates. On the other hand, it may bt: bir to sav that 
the Constitution contemplates that, within tTason, Presidents know that to which tht·y 
assent. To what extent must they analyze conunilln· reports and dcbatt·s and het on the 
outcome of a judicial process which considers sud1 materials? The answers arc not 
dear. Perhaps. in cases where, on language almw. thcrt· is one dearly prdi.-rable mean-
ing of an an as to a partintlar issue. a President should he able to secure that meaning 
hy cxpresslv endorsing it. The courts would in dl(:ct allow the President, "hy opting lin· 
the words," to eliminate or vastly reduce the rckvam:c of legislative historv. l\jotc that 
adopting this approach will not solve problems under GRH or othn dictionary acts. 
because thetT the precise issue is not the languag·e of the an being construed. hut how 
much liKus should he placnl upon earlier kgislation in arriving at latet· meaning. 
23. Sn' sujJm note 2. 
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grounds: ( 1) improper delegation of legislative power, in the Pan-
ama Refining24 and Schechter 25 line of argument and (2) delegation of 
legislative power to an improper delegate, in the Buckley v. Valeo 2 G 
line. 
The first argument has not been deployed successfully against a 
federal statute since 1935, when the Court declared that legislative 
standards, channeling the discretion granted, are necessary for con-
stitutional delegations of legislative power.27 Since that time, the 
Court, while incanting the need for statutory standards, has allowed 
the delegation of vast powers to regulate the economy despite little 
statutory guidance as to the policies to be pursued.28 
Long thought dead or near dead as a constitutional limitation 
with real world bite,29 the delegation theory has enjoyed at least a 
minor renaissance in Supreme Court dicta in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In 1974, in National Cable Television Association v. United States,30 five 
Justices, including three currently on the Court (Justices Burger, 
Rehnquist, and White) construed a statute in one of two possible 
ways to avoid what they perceived to be a serious possibility that the 
other construction would fail if analyzed in terms of constitutional 
limits on delegation. 31 Some congressional powers, the majority 
suggested, might fall within a legislative core and, hence, be either 
undelegable or delegable only under very stringent limits and 
protections.32 
In 1980, in Industrial Union v. American Petroleum /nstitute, 33 three 
Justices, including one not involved in Cable T.V. (Justice Stevens), 
24. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
25. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
26. 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam). 
27. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND REGULATORY POLICY 90 
(1985). 
28. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 3:1-3: 10 (2d ed. 1978) 
(discussing delegation doctrine and its abandonment). For examples of cases upholding 
delegations despite vague standards, see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); 
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Corp. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); United States v. Rock 
Royal Co-operatives, 307 U.S. 533 ( 1939). 
29. See I K. DAVIS, supm note 28. 
30. 415 u.s. 336 (1974). 
31. /d. at 342. The statute allowed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
to impose a filing fee based on, inter alia, the "public policy or interest served." The 
Court feared that such a consideration would transform the fee into a tax, which could 
be imposed only by Congress. /d. at 341. Thus, the Court determined that the "public 
policy or interest served" criterion did not apply; rather, the FCC should base its fees on 
the "value to the recipient" of its services. /d. at 342-43. 
32. /d. at 340-42. 
33. 44H U.S. 607 (19HO). 
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construed a statute somewhat narrowly to avoid possible problems 
with the delegation doctrine.34 Although he concurred in the judg-
ment, Justice Rehnquist would have found the delegation unconsti-
tutional because the statute lacked sufficient standards to guide the 
delegate's discretion. 35 Dissenting in a case the following year, and 
this time joined by the ChiefJustice,Justice Rehnquist favored strik-
ing down a delegation that he saw as so standardless that it consti-
tuted an abdication of Congress' policymaking responsibility.36 
Based on the opinions described above, four current Justices 
seem to take the delegation doctrine quite seriously; at least three of 
them may still believe in the existence of core legislative powers that 
are at least relatively undelegable. Moreover, all four believe that 
the presence of meaningful standards, at least when possible, is a 
requirement for a valid delegation. Justices Blackmun, Powell, and 
O'Connor have not made known their position on delegation. Still, 
the fact that four of their colleagues, and the two Justices most re-
cently retired from the Court, are on record as willing to scrutinize 
delegations suggests a likelihood that at least one of the uncommit-
ted Justices would take a similar position. Indeed, even Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, who have suggested that virtually anything 
goes after the movement away from Schechter and Panama, 37 might 
well view the delegation in GRH as of a different order. 
GRH allows agencies to determine, by estimating the size of the 
deficits, how much to cut federal spending otherwise authorized by 
Congress. Even if it must be constantly renewed by Congress to be 
effective,38 that power is potentially greater in impact than any dele-
gated so far. GRH will reduce outlays in fiscal year 1986 by roughly 
4.5%. 3 n The magnitude of the cuts required in following fiscal years 
has been estimated to be as high as 27.1% of nonexempt, 
nondefense programs.40 As a result, the delegation argument 
should get thoughtful attention from the Court. 
34. /d. at 646, 652. Although Justice Powell concurred in the construction of the 
statute. he expressed no view about a difl'erent interpretation's violating the delegation 
doctrine. /d. at (i(i4 n.l (Powell, j.. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
35. /d. at 686 (Rehnquist, J .. concurring in the judgment). 
36. American Textile Mfrs. In st. v. Donovan. 452 U.S. 490. 54!~ (I 981) (Rehnquist . 
.J.. dissent in g). 
37. National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States. 415tr.s. 3!Hi. 344 (1!174); FPC 
v. New England Power Co .. ·II.'> l I .S. 345. 352-60 (I !174) (Marshall and Brennan .. lJ .. 
dissent in g). 
3H. Sn• sujmt notes :1-21 and accompanying text. 
3!). 44 CON(;. Q, 13!'> (I !l81i). 
40. /d. at 13H. 
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The threshold issue is whether the power to determine the defi-
cit size and, hence the cuts, involves the kind and quantity of discre-
tion that conceivably could trigger antidelegation analysis. First, 
should the power to make predictions be characterized as delegated 
lawmaking power if the predictions themselves have immediate legal 
consequences? Certainly, in GRH Congress may have envisioned 
an administrative mental process different from that expected from 
· those involved in ordinary administrative rulemaking. Still, if there 
is room for and incentive to manipulate the predictions in order to 
alter the state of the law, such predictive powers could be used to 
the same effect as rulemaking power. Even assuming utmost good 
faith on the part of those administering GRH, if reasonable, quali-
fied forecasters could make vastly different predictions, delegation 
of predictive powers seems as much an abdication of congressional 
responsibility as delegated rulemaking. Therefore, delegation of 
the power to make such predictions should be judged by the stan-
dards applicable to delegations of lawmaking authority.41 
Accepting this analysis, the amount of discretion is the crucial 
issue. That amount seems to depend upon the extent of agreement 
41 . The early cases sustaining what later commentators view as a species of dele-
gated lawmaking authority involved rules prescribed in a statute which conditioned their 
operation upon the existence of a fact or facts to be found by the executive branch. The 
Court typically treated the executive involvement as one of factfinding and not dele-
gated lawmaking power. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); The Brig Aurora, II U.S. 
(7 Cranch) 382 (1813). For discussion of these cases, see W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, & P. 
STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: CASES AND COMMENTS 52-54 (7th ed. 1979). 
For the Court to conclude that legislative power has been delegated, it must first 
conclude that the authority given to the agency apparatus in GRH is more than the 
power to find ordinary facts mechanically. Such a conclusion should be easy given the 
generally controversial nature of economic projections. Even so, to conclude a delega-
tion occurred, the Court must then distinguish or overrule Aurora and Clark, both of 
which made the operation of international trade rules dependent upon rather complex 
political or economic judgments characterized as factlinding. In Aurora, for example. the 
key question was whether certain warlike activities had ceased. II l'.S. (7 Cram·h) at 
~RH. In Fidd. it was whether fon:ig·n tarifl"s on United States goods were "reciprocally 
unequal and lllli"Casonahlc." 14~ U.S. at ()80-81. There is obviously room, m·e•· a wide 
,·ariel~· of states of the world. for reasonable people, e\·en those from similar t•ducational 
and political suhcult lilTS, to diHcr as to the existence of situations so described. Conse-
quently. there is precedent feu· the constitutionalitY of such "f~Ktfinding." 
Despite this. it is difficult to hdieve that a modern Court would not l"l'cognize that, 
at least in cases of blatant standanllessness, what is ch;n·<Klerized as bet finding is in brt 
discretionary lawmaking power. If the Court recognizes this, then the conclusion is not 
automatic im·alidit\·, hut rathe•· that the delegation doctrine in its present fc>nn is the 
appropriate test of constillltionality. At this stag·e. the amount of true discn·tion granted 
henunes relevant because it seems a compont·nt of ddq.(at ion docu·ine analysis on am· 
,·iew of that dortJ·ine. In sum, a finding that significant discretion has heen n·sted in the 
GRI-I agencies is likdy to he ll("l"CSSal·y, first, to just if\· the application of delegation doc-
trine analysis and, second, to a ronrlusion of im·alidit\· upon its application. 
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on the method for predicting revenues and outlays, and especially 
for predicting major contributing factors such as real growth, inter-
est rates, and unemployment. The Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which 
make the initial determination under GRH and average their conclu-
sions when they do not agree, came within $.8 billion dollars of each 
other's estimate of an approximately $221 billion deficit for fiscal 
year 1986.42 This consensus may cause some to conclude that the 
prediction is simply a mechanical one. It seems more reasonable, 
however, to view it as an aberration. Past gross disparities in similar 
predictions suggest an immense amount of discretion in making the 
predictions. For example, the OMB predicted a deficit of $91.5 bil-
lion for fiscal year 1983, the first full fiscal year under President Rea-
gan; the actual deficit was $195.5 billion.43 
In addition to the discretion involved, the availability of judicial 
review is an important, related factor in determining the validity of 
attempted delegations. From the perspective of scholarly commen-
tators at least, Judge Harold Levanthal wrote the most influential 
modern opinion dealing with the delegation doctrine in Amalgamated 
Meat Cutters v. Connally.44 Rejecting the extremes of carte blanche 
power to delegate and per se condemnation of delegation, he 
stressed an approach that considered not only the need for delega-
tion and the relative clarity of the legislative directions to the dele-
gate, but also the presence of protections from abuse, particularly 
the availability of judicial review. Justice Rehnquist, in his 1980 con-
currence in Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Institute, also placed 
great weight on the availability of meaningful judicial review in 
judging the constitutionality of a delegation.45 GRH, it is worth not-
ing, provides that no court shall review the "data, assumptions or 
methodologies" underlying the final administrative determination 
42. Sequestration Report for Fiscal Year 1986 - A Joint Report to the Comptroller 
General of the United States, 51 Fed. Reg. 1923 (1986). 
43. 131 CoN G. REc. S 14,905 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1985). An excellent description of the 
difficulties involved in predicting the size of deficits can be found in some of Senator 
Moynihan's remarks on GRH and its background. It includes a discussion of recent past 
disparities between OMB and CBO predictions on the one hand, and between those 
predictions and the actual performance of the economy on the other./d. at Sl4,905-07. 
44. 377 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). One distinguished trio of commentators has 
characterized this opinion as "masterful." W. GELLHORN, C. BYsE & P. STRAUSS, .wpm 
note 41, at 70 n.l. A majority of the Supreme Court itself has cited .\leal Cullm· in 
addition to its own most basic opinions on the delegation doctrine. SPI' Eastlake v. For-
est City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 675 (1976). 
45. See 448 U.S. at 2886-87. (Rehnquist, J.. concurring in the judgment). 
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of the deficits by the Comptroller General.46 
Some conclusions follow. If the Court concludes, as much evi-
dence indicates, that the deficit-determining function under GRH is 
not simply a mechanical process, but involves substantial discretion, 
then the Act may well be overturned on delegation grounds. So 
viewed, GRH abdicates to bureaucrats a key political decision cut-
ting across all areas of federal activity. Congress wants such deci-
sions to be made initially by a mindless averaging of two 
predictions, which is then subject to revision in some ill-defined, un-
reviewable way by a third bureaucrat. It may be too much to ask 
Congress itself to make all substantive federal policy ranging from 
aviation to zoology. These problems ofmicromanagement are what 
delegated lawmaking authority was designed for and, indeed, pro-
vide a major justification for federal administrative agencies. GRH 
is different. In light of the potential across-the-board effects on fed-
eral programs, is it too much to require Congress to determine for 
itself annually, with all the advice that it wants from OMB, CBO, and 
others, the crucial political fact of this and probably the next several 
years? I suspect that the Supreme Court may well think not. 
The second attack on GRH assumes, for purposes of argument, 
that the power to cut the budget described above can be delegated 
to some administrative agency, but asserts that the Constitution pro-
hibits the choice of delegates made in GRH. To understand this 
argument, one must understand its origins in the administrative law 
revolution of the 1930s and 1940s. During those years it became 
established that Congress could part with some of its legislative 
power.47 Although the lines between executive discretion and law-
making are inherently blurred, by 1950 it was clear to any thought-
ful lawyer that the Constitution, as originally understood, had been 
changed to allow nonlegislative branch "legislation. " 48 This change 
created a problem: How should constitutional provisions and doc-
trine written and evolved without the institution of delegated law-
making in mind be applied to this new institution? In particular, 
how should the repositories of such powers be appointed and 
removed? 
46. GRH § 274(h). 
47. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
48. "Delegation of power to administration is the dynamo of the modern social ser-
vice state .... It must be admitted that in the field of federal administration the [an-
tidelegation I doctrine as it operates today is essentially a caveat, a hint of reserved 
power." Jaffee, An Essay on Delegation of Legislatille Power: II, 47 Cm.!IM. L. RE\'. 561, 592 
(1947). Other passages are also interesting. !d. at 577-81, 592-93. See also I K. DAVIS, 
supra note 28 (discussing abandonment of nondelegation doctrine). 
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In 1935, the Court made clear in Humphrey's Executor 4 !' that Con-
gress could limit the President's usual power to remove some of the 
officers appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate. 50 An earlier decision of the Court elaborating, not the constitu-
tional text, but separation of powers implications drawn from its 
structure, had held that, at least as to some executive branch of-
ficers, the President had absolute power of dismissal. 5 1 Humphrey's 
Executor limited the implications of that decision and enabled the es-
tablishment of the independent regulatory agencies, which are 
called that precisely because they are exempt from Presidential re-
moval pressures.52 
Buckley v. Valeo, 53 in 1974, dealt with the other portion of the 
problem: Must all repositories of delegated legislative power be of-
ficers of the United States, appointed by and with the consent of the 
Senate? Some of the officers of the Federal Election Commission, 
which had the power to make regulations limiting campaign contri-
butions, were appointed not by the President with senatorial con-
sent, but directly by officers of Congress.54 The Court found this 
arrangement constitutionally impermissible. Anyone possessing 
significant authority under the laws of the United States was an "of-
ficer of the United States" within the meaning of Article Il's ap-
pointment provision,55 and hence must be appointed by the 
President with senatorial consent. 56 
This decision contributed to the continuously unfolding pro-
cess of mapping the old rules of separation of powers onto the new 
49. 295 u.s. 602 (1935). 
50. !d. at 631-32. 
51. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
52. 295 U.S. at 626-32. 
53. 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam). 
54. /d. at 113. Officers of Congress appointed six of the Commission's eight mem-
bers; only four of these six had voting privileges. For a description of the Commission, 
including its powers and the methods for appointing commissioners, see id. at I 09-113. 
55. !d. at 125-26. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2 recognizes two methods of appoint-
ment of "officers of the United States." First, for all such officers, it recognizes Presi-
dential appointment with senatorial advice and consent. Second, for officers other than 
"Ambassadors," "Ministers," "Consuls," and 'Judges of the Supreme Court," Con-
gress may by law vest the appointment power in "the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments." Because it has not been used, the second provision was implicated in 
none of the cases under discussion. Nevertheless, note that it does not authorize legisla-
tion vesting appointment power in Congress or its officers. 
56. 424 U.S. at 140-41. Superficially, Buckley might be read as concerned solely with 
appointments of those exercising purely executive functions such as enforcement. See id. 
at 138. Through the breadth of its statements covering all significant authority under 
feder·al law, id. at 141, Burkley makes clear, however, that those possessing delegated 
lawmaking authority arc within its sweep. 
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institution of delegated lawmaking. As a result of the Court's broad 
definition of "officer of the United States" in Buckley, Congress is 
free to retain its lawmaking power or to delegate it to executive 
branch officers or independent agencies. It may not, however, 
"delegate" to parts of itself or even to both houses acting together 
without the President's participation. 57 
Both the appointment and the removal of officers participating 
in decisions under GRH pose problems for that legislation, as the 
plaintiffs' briefs in the two cases make clear. Recall that the OMB 
and CBO make the initial determinations under GRH. If they do 
not agree, they average their conclusions. The Comptroller Gen-
eral, the head of the General Accounting Office (GAO), then re-
views their joint report and issues a decision based on that joint 
report. 58 Congress appoints the director of the CBO; thus, it is clear 
that, were the GAO not interposed as a final decisionmaker, GRH's 
administrative apparatus would violate the Constitution as elabo-
rated in Buckley. 
The congressional plaintiffs argue, in essence, that the GAO's 
involvement should be ignored because it is not a meaningful par-
ticipant in the administrative process. 5 9 Their brief cites the follow-
ing facts: First, the Comptroller General has only a short period-
five days-in which to review the joint OMB-CBO decision.60 Sec-
ond, GRH provides that, if any of its administrative decisionmaking 
provisions are struck down, Congress must automatically begin con-
sideration of a budget having the features prescribed by the joint 
report. 61 This provision gives credence to the plaintiffs' third, more 
general, argument: GRH, as revealed by its legislative history, views 
57. The "incompatibility clause," U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2, which prohibits mem-
bers of Congress, during their tenure, from holding "any civil Office under the Author-
ity of the United States," may prevent even a law signed by the President from 
accomplishing a delegation of lawmaking authority to Congress or a part of Congress. 
The issue is now largely academic, because the Court accomplished the same result in 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), by interpreting 
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, cis. 2, 3, as allowing Congress to make laws only after complying 
with the Constitution's requirements ofbicamerality and presentment. 462 U.S. at 952-
57. For further discussion of Chadha, see infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
58. GRH § 25l(b)(l) requires the Comptroller General to give "due regard" to the 
OMB-CBO report. The report submiued to Congress must explain fully any differences 
between the Comptroller's and the OMB-CBO reports. !d. § 251 (b)(2). 
59. See Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for Summary Judgmem at 
38-48, Synar v. United States, No. 85-3945 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1986) (available Feb. 28. 
1986, on LEXIS. Genfed Library). 
60. lrl. at 39-40. 
61. /d. at 42. 
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the Comptroller General as simply a figurehead, placed on the or-
ganization chart to insulate the mechanism from what would other-
wise certainly be a fatal challenge under Buckley.62 
GRH's supporters respond to these arguments as follows: 
First, the GAO need not wait until it has the joint report to prepare 
to review it; what must be predicted and the data on which the pre-
dictions will be based are fairly clear.63 Second, the legislative his-
tory makes clear that the House of Representatives insisted upon 
the insertion of the Comptroller General as the final meaningful 
decisionmaker because it did not trust economic predictions to 
which the OMB significantly contributed.64 This was true, accord-
ing to the briefs, because OMB's earlier unrealistic predictions of 
real economic growth, which it used to argue for the 1981 tax cut, 
angered the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives.65 
Since GRH's enactment, the Comptroller General has shown some 
independence,66 which is probably unreviewable by the courts even 
if challenged.67 As a result of this and of what would certainly be a 
reluctance to find congressional subterfuge unless beyond doubt, it 
seems unlikely that the courts will dispute the Comptroller's place 
as final decisionmaker. 
The justice Department has, however, indicated that it will chal-
lenge the Comptroller's office itself as a constitutionally impermissi-
ble delegate.68 With this delegate, there are no problems under 
Buckley: by statute the Comptroller General is appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.69 Thus, the 
GAO seems, on the surface, a valid independent regulatory agency. 
The arguments about the Comptroller General's ineligibility center 
on the provisions for removal. No remotely comparable act creating 
62. See id. at 40-42. 
63. Senate Memorandum, supra note 5, at 33. 
64. Speaker Memorandum, supra note 5, at 16-22, 52. 
65. !d. 
66. Budget Reduction for Fiscal Year 1986: A Report to the President of the United 
States, President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 2813-15 (1986). Although the Comptroller General used the same major eco-
nomic assumptions as underlie the OMB-CBO Joint Report and appears to have reached 
conclusions only slightly different from those in that report, he apparently believes that 
he has the option of employing different assumptions and suggests a willingness to do so 
in the future. See id. at 2813-15, 2847. 
67. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
68. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 30 n.l 0. Synar 
v. United States, No. 85-3945 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1986) (available Feb. 28, 1986, on LEX IS, 
Genfed Library). The expedited schedule prevented the Department from presenting 
its arguments on the merits in this memorandum. !d. 
69. 31 U.S.C. § 703(a}(l) (1982). 
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an independent agency like GAO has a provision for removal by a 
joint resolution of Congress for specified cause. 70 The President's 
lawyers must object primarily to the fact that, as to the Comptroller 
General, the President has lost the typical statutory power to initiate 
removal, and in the case when a veto is overridden, to block it. 
While this may not seem a serious encroachment, particularly since 
Congress is limited to removal for cause, two of the most distin-
guished commentators on administrative law (Jaffee and Nathanson) 
saw the status of the Comptroller as subject to serious questioning 
on separation of powers grounds. 71 
While one must take very seriously Messrs. Jaffee's and Nathan-
son's concern, it was expressed only as that and not as a judgment 
of condemnation. On balance, the GAO seems a permissible repos-
itory. The Constitution does not address removal expressly, and 
the constitutional limits on congressional control of removal of 
agency heads are constitutional common law. 72 In the context of 
agencies meant to be independent of the political branches, there 
should be room for a wide variety of solutions to the removal prob-
lem. The Court has developed, and should continue to develop, the 
constitutional common law because it must create rules to balance 
power in light of its decisions permitting delegated lawmaking pow-
ers. "For cause" removal powers, which allow the President a 
meaningful, if non-initiatory, role, seem one reasonable way to bal-
ance power in the absence of textual constitutional prohibitions. 
70. See 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(l)(B) (1982). Additionally, as an "officer of the United 
States," the Comptroller General is subject to impeachment by the House of Represent-
atives and conviction by the Senate. 
The independent regulatory agencies often have commissioners or a director who, 
by clear statutory provision, can be removed by a President for specified cause. See, e.g., 
49 U.S.C. § I030l(c) (1982) (President may remove a commissioner of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."): L. 
JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE L\w; CASES AND MATERIALS 162 (4th ed. 1976). 
In some cases a statute is silent as to removal, leaving an as yet unresolved uncertainty as 
to whether some additional Presidential removal powers are to be implied. !d. See. e.g .. 
15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1982) (specifying appointment but not removal process for mem-
bers of Securities and Exchange Commission). 
71. See JAFFEE & NATHANSON, supra note 70. 
72. The phrase "constitutional common law" refers to the "substructure of substan-
tive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from. but 
not required by, various constitutional provisions." Monaghan, The Supreme Court 19i-l 
Term-Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. I, 2-3 (1975). 
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3. Mapping the Old Constitutional Text onto New Institutions: 
GRH, Chadha, and the Reagan Administration's View 
of Separation Powers 
17 
Ranging well beyond the two specific arguments discussed 
above is the relationship of GRH to the Court's and the Reagan Ad-
ministration's recent positions on separation of powers issues. In 
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 73 the Court declared 
unconstitutional the legislative veto, which had permitted Congress 
to allow either one or both houses, acting without Presidential par-
ticipation, to repeal specified agency regulations. As often stated 
another way, the legislative veto conditioned the legal efficacy of 
agency regulations upon such legislative branch consent. 
The Court concluded that, because the legislative veto deter-
mines the state of the law, it is legislation and its intended effects 
can be accomplished only by an act of both houses of Congress 
presented to the President.74 In reaching such a conclusion, a ma-
jority of the Court seemed blind to the task at hand.75 This task 
requires the Court to continue to give meaning to the Constitution 
after it has allowed a major structural departure from the docu-
ment's provisions as originally understood. It is not clear that it is 
fair to characterize the legislative veto as the sort of thing the Fram-
ers had in mind in providing a process for legislation: The legisla-
tive veto was a check on a process that could not have existed under 
73. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
74. The Court applied U.S. CoNST. art. l, § 7, cls. 2, 3, which specify that laws are 
made by an affirmative vote of both houses and presentment to the President for a possi-
ble veto. 462 U.S. at 952-57. In doing so, it apparently concluded that any action of 
Congress aimed at altering legal relationships, other than those involving the internal 
affairs of the two houses of Congress, must either comply with the requirements of bi-
camerality and presentment in order to be valid or be within one of the few express 
constitutional exceptions. /d. 
75. In a footnote, the majority attempted to respond to the assertion that the Court 
had sanctioned a departure from the Constitution by allowing Congress to delegate law-
making power. 462 U.S. at 953 n.l6. According to the majority, the fact that the statute 
which delegates lawmaking power also limits the delegate's authority distinguishes dele-
gation from the legislative veto. /d. It is, however, undeniable that within the limits 
drawn by the statute the agency is free to convert policy choices into rules having the 
force of law. To the extent that the Court continues to allow the broadest delegations 
under the most vague standards, the majority's dictinction between delegation and the 
legislative veto has little substance. It amounts to a justification of delegation on the 
grounds that some limits exist. To the extent that the Court anticipates tightening the 
requirements for standards, as suggested in American Petroleum, supra note 33, and .-lmni-
can Textile Manufacturen, supra note 36, the distinction seems more coherent. Still, if the 
tightening is not so complete as to leave delegates with no major policymaking func-
tions, delegation is more of a departure than the legislative veto. 
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the Constitution as originally understood. The majority did not se-
riously consider how the legislative veto enhanced or disturbed the 
balance of the relative powers of the branches in light of agency law-
making. Instead, the Court resorted to the syllogism mentioned 
above-the legislative veto changes the law: therefore it is 
legislation. 
It is as if early mapmakers, in attempting to "map" a flat map 
onto a globe, determined that they would preserve both the shapes 
and the relative areas of the continents, and then mapped to pre-
serve only the shapes, deeming the areas to take care of themselves. 
Of course they do not: topologically both cannot be perfectly pre-
served.76 One can preserve one or the other almost perfectly or dis-
tort both to some intermediate degrees, but a choice must be made, 
a choice best informed by the purpose at hand. 77 When the Court 
changed the topology of the Constitution by allowing virtually limit-
less delegation, it put itself in the position of having to make a 
choice between the literal application of other old rules to the new 
institutions that it sanctioned or the creation of new rules for the 
new institutions aimed at a similar interbranch balance as the old. 
The Court responded by making a choice while denying it was doing 
so. 
Chadha may be part of a program of more literal or Framer-
oriented constitutional interpretation, at least in the separation of 
powers area. If so, Chadha s unarticulated corollary must include 
some movement toward recognizing a meaningful delegation doc-
trine, one that would insist that Congress make the main policy 
choices and set intelligible limits on agency discretion. If this is the 
program of a majority ofjustices/8 then it is at least coherent as the 
product of evenhandedness in the application of a theory of consti-
tutional interpretation, whether or not it is desirable in terms of 
practical effects or legal or political philosophy. If this is the direc-
tion of the Court, however, GRH seems ill starred unless the Court 
does conclude that the administrative apparatus makes a fairly 
mechanical decision in determining the size of the deficits. 
On the other hand, it would seem inconsistent after Chadha for 
76. Mapping and Surveying, 23 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 522 (l 985). 
77. /d. 
78. I am not suggesting that a majority of the Justices adhere, or even that any single 
Justice adheres, to a completely rigid Framers' intent-oriented theory of constitutional 
interpretation. There are degrees in these matters. A discussion of the voluminous cur-
rent literature on the proper ways of construing our Constitution is beyond the scope of 
this article. 
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the Court to uphold GRH, if that Act is seen as conferring discretion 
to make momentous decisions. Such a decision would be based on a 
double standard of constitutional interpretation, allowing a depar-
ture from the one of the Constitution's most central provisions 
granting legislative power to Congress while not allowing the legis-
lative veto, a more modest departure, designed as a check upon the 
first. 
The Reagan Administration has been opinionated and active in 
connection with current constitutional issues, including those in-
volving separation of powers. In Chadha it urged the unconstitu-
tionality of the legislative veto. As for GRH, the President signed it 
while questioning its constitutionality, 79 and, as discussed above, 
the Justice Department plans to attack it under separation of powers 
doctrine. 
The executive branch is also preparing the first serious chal-
lenge in nearly half a century to the constitutionality of the in-
dependent regulatory agencies.80 Its grounds are nonadherence to 
the original view of government's three kinds of powers as con-
signed respectively to three branches, and, with express exceptions, 
relatively heremetically sealed therein. For example, Attorney Gen-
eral Meese, who has in general urged a return to the framers' "origi-
nal understanding"81 as the test for constitutional interpretation, 
recently applied that view to the question of the legitimacy of in-
dependent regulatory agencies: 
Federal agencies performing executive functions are them-
selves properly agents of the executive; they are not 'quasi' 
this or 'independent' that. In the tripartite scheme of gov-
ernment, a body with enforcement powers is part of the 
executive branch of govemment.82 
This constitutional purist position, particularly as applied to separa-
tion of powers questions, seems based more on convenience than 
principle in light of other positions that the Administration has 
taken. The Administration has, of course, nowhere abjured power 
79. 43 CoNe. Q 2604 (1985). 
80. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1985, at B8, col. 3. 
81. /d., Nov. 16, 1985, § l, at II, col. l ("Meese Says Some Judges Practice 'Chame-
leon Jurisprudence'"). For a description of the origins of the Administration's cam-
paign and of the rare public responses by Supreme Court Justices to criticism, see id., 
Oct. 28, 1985, at Al2, col. 3 ("Administration Trolling for Constitutional Debate"). 
82. N. Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1985, § l, at II, col. l. 
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on grounds that Congress cannot delegate its powers to the Presi-
dent, and, more particularly, it has sought delegated power to exer-
cise a line-item veto of congressionally authorized expenditures.H3 
Such a veto is an even clearer constitutional departure and abdica-
tion of legislative power than GRH.84 Because the power to deter-
mine the level of spending was not originally understood as an 
executive function, it seems that Mr. Meese is willing to accept at 
least one convenient departure from the original understanding, 
while rejecting another, the safeguard of an independent delegate. 
Coherently, he can hold either his strict "original understanding" 
position as to constitutional interpretation or hold a view permitting 
broad delegation to the executive branch, not both. 
In conclusion, if the Court reviews GRH on delegation 
grounds, Chadha may well have created a pressure for coherence 
which will tip the balance against such a massive surrender of con-
gressional power. More broadly, it seems unlikely that, however the 
Court disposes of GRH, it will return radically to what the Adminis-
tration has occasionally urged as dispositive "original understand-
ing." At least with the Court as presently constituted, ordinary 
delegations of ordinary powers seem safe as does the existence of 
the independent regulatory agencies. 
83. Most recently, President Reagan requested such authority in his 1986 State of 
the Union Address. Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of Congress, 22 WEEKLY 
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 164 (Feb. 10, 1986). See also 43 CoNe. Q 1486 (1985); id. at 1415; N. 
Y. Times, May 4, 1984, at Al9, col. I. 
84. While an attempt might be made to justify congressionally conferred line-item 
veto power as simply confirming inherent executive powers of impoundment, the cases 
and scholarly literature spawned by the impoundment crises during the Nixon adminis-
tration suggest that such powers are much too narrow to support the line-item veto. See 
Quint, The Separation of Powers under Nixon: Rejlertions on Constitutional Liberties and the Rnle 
of Law, 1981 DuKE LJ. I, 14-17 for a discussion of the case law. For a sampling of the 
scholarly literature, see Abascal and Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Par/ 1: Historiral 
Gmesis and Constitutional Framework, 62 GEo. LJ. 1549, 1618 (1974); Mikva and Hertz. 
Impoundment of Funds- The Courts, Congws and the President: .1 Constitutional Triangle. 69 Nw. 
U.L. REv. 335, 376-89 ( 1974); Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1505, 1534-
35 (1973). 
